

EXHIBIT NO. 178**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

1. Memorandum dated May 9, 1946 from State Department Liaison Officer to Committee Counsel concerning date of receipt of letter from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, dated September 22, 1941, addressed to President Roosevelt.

2. Memorandum dated October 30, 1941 from Secretary of State for the President enclosing a reply for the President to send to Ambassador Grew, pursuant to the Ambassador's letter of September 22, 1941.

3. Memorandum from the President to the Secretary of State and attached letter dated September 22, 1941 from Ambassador Grew to the President.

4. Copy of letter dated September 1, 1941 from Ambassador Grew to a Japanese friend, in which he summarizes this government's policy concerning Japan, and which he enclosed with his letter to the President dated September 22, 1941.

5. Memorandum dated November 8, 1941 and attached dispatch #1769 dated November 7, 1941 from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, to the State Department (two sections).

6. Dispatch #1893 dated December 5, 1941 from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, to the State Department.

7. Dispatch #1910 dated December 8, 1941 from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, to State Department relating the reply of the Japanese Emperor to the President's message of December 6, 1941.

MAY 9, 1946.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON

The Honorable SETH W. RICHARDSON,
*General Counsel, Joint Committee on the Investigation
of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Congress of the United States.*

DEAR MR. RICHARDSON: Reference is made to Mr. Masten's oral inquiry regarding the date of receipt in Washington of Ambassador Grew's letter to President Roosevelt dated September 22, 1941, which was transmitted by the President to the State Department on October 29, 1941. A careful search has been made, but no information has been found in the Department's records relative to this question. However, for your information in this connection the Department's records show that several mail despatches from Tokyo bearing the dates September 3, September 15 and September 20, 1941 were received in the Department's Division of Communications and Records on October 27, 1941.

Sincerely yours,

HERBERT S. MARKS,
Assistant to the Under Secretary.

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.



*file
plus mail*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

October 30, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In accordance with your memorandum of October 29, 1941 transmitting a letter of September 22 addressed to you by Ambassador Grew at Tokyo, there is enclosed for your consideration a draft reply to Mr. Grew.

Ambassador Grew's letter and its enclosure are returned herewith.

C H

Enclosures:

1. To the Honorable Joseph C. Grew.
 2. From the Honorable Joseph C. Grew, September 22, with enclosure.
- C H*

October 20, 1941

Dear Jack:

I am much interested in the statements contained in your letter of September 22, 1941 in regard to Prince Kamehameha. It seems a pity that during the time that he was President, Hawaii could not have been pulled in Japan's cause and strategic support for a unification and peace in the Pacific.

I also have read with interest the copy, which you enclosed, of a letter addressed by you to a Congressman which has called for American sympathy and cooperation in the pursuit of Japan of "her legitimate interests and aspirations". It seems to me that in your letter you discussed, generally and comprehensively the subject of American attitude toward relations with Japan. I appreciate your having sent me a copy of the letter.

Very sincerely yours,

Franklin D. Roosevelt
President of the United States
Washington, D. C.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


CONFIDENTIAL

October 29, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Will you read the enclosed
from Joe Grew and let me have a
suggested reply?

F. D. R.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
OCT 29 1941
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

711.94

3457

THE AMERICAN EMBASSY,
Tokyo, September 22, 1941.

THE PRESIDENT,
THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON.

DEAR FRANK: I have not bothered you with personal letters for some time for the good reason that letters are now subject to long delays owing to the infrequent sailings of ships carrying our diplomatic pouches, and because developments in American-Japanese relations are moving so comparatively rapidly that my comments would generally be too much out of date to be helpful when they reached you. But I have tried and am constantly trying in my telegrams to the Secretary of State to paint an accurate picture of the moving scene from day to day. I hope that you see them regularly.

As you know from my telegrams, I am in close touch with Prince Konoye who in the face of bitter antagonism from extremist and pro-Axis elements in the country is courageously working for an improvement in Japan's relations with the United States. He bears the heavy responsibility for having allowed our relations to come to such a pass and he no doubt now sees the handwriting on the wall and realizes that Japan has nothing to hope for from the Tripartite Pact and must shift her orientation of policy if she is to avoid disaster; but whatever the incentive that has led to his present efforts, I am convinced that he now means business and will go as far as is possible, without incurring open rebellion in Japan, to reach a reasonable understanding with us. In spite of all the evidence of Japan's bad faith in times past in failing to live up to her commitments, I believe that there is a better chance of the present Government implementing whatever commitments it may now undertake than has been the case in recent years. It seems to me highly unlikely that this chance will come again or that any Japanese statesman other than Prince Konoye could succeed in controlling the military extremists in carrying through a policy which they, in their ignorance of international affairs and economic laws, resent and oppose. The alternative to reaching a settlement now would be the greatly increased probability of war—*Facilis descensus Averno est*—and while we would undoubtedly win in the end, I question whether it is in our own interest to see an impoverished Japan reduced to the position of a third-rate Power. I therefore most earnestly hope that we can come to terms, even if we must take on trust, at least to some degree, the continued good faith and ability of the present Government fully to implement those terms.

I venture to enclose a copy of a letter which I recently wrote to a Japanese friend who had expressed the hope that the United States would ultimately come to sympathize and to cooperate with Japanese in pursuing her "legitimate interests and aspiration". The letter was sent by my friend, on his own initiative, to Prince Konoye.

My admiration of the masterly way in which you have led and are leading our country in the present turmoil in world affairs steadily increases.

Faithfully yours,

JOSEPH G. GREW.

Enclosure.

Copy of a letter from the American Ambassador, Mr. Grew, to a Japanese friend who wrote expressing the hope that the American Government would ultimately come to sympathize and, if possible, to cooperate with Japan in pursuing her "legitimate interests and aspirations".

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Tokyo, September 1, 1941

My dear

I well know how deeply the present situation in international affairs is paining you, just as it is paining me. It is a dark and critical period that we are passing through, but during the past nine years I have seen our two countries pass through several crises and surmount them, and I firmly believe that we shall eventually surmount the present one. I cannot visualize the utter stupidity of war ensuing between Japan and the United States, and if ever a break should occur I feel convinced that it will not come as a result of any deliberated act on the part of either of our Governments but rather through some unfortunate act brought about by extremist elements. I know very well that Prince Kono and Admiral Toyoda, and the President and Mr. Hull, are

doing their utmost to avoid war and are dealing with the situation with the highest statesmanship, courage and far-sighted vision. Pray God that they may be allowed to achieve success and that their enlightened efforts will not be wrecked by short-sighted and intransigent elements in either country.

But many things have been done over the past several years and are being done today which are not permitted to come to the knowledge of the public in Japan, and therefore it is very difficult, I should say impossible, for the Japanese people to view the situation objectively and to weigh all the factors which have led to the present unhappy pass in our relations. Merely as an illustration, I doubt if many Japanese know of the serious incidents which occurred only recently, when Japanese aviators attacked our Embassy and our navy ship the TUTUILA, sister ship of the ill-fated PANAY, in Chungking on several occasions; our Embassy was damaged, fortunately without loss of American lives, and a bomb missed the TUTUILA by only a few yards, but damaged her. Our Embassy and our ship are in a safety zone, recognized by the Japanese Government, and no military objectives are near them. Three American officers who witnessed the attack on the TUTUILA from a near-by hill have officially expressed their opinion

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that the attack was deliberate or, at the very least, due to criminal negligence. The Japanese planes came over in perfectly clear weather; one plane left the others and took a course directly over the TUTUILA, dropping its bomb as it passed over the ship and missing her only by a split-second of time. If the ship had been sunk, or if our Ambassador had been killed, as might easily have occurred, I do not think that the present status of our relations could have stood the strain because the entire American people would have become enflamed. I said this to Mr. Matsuoka early in June after the first attack on our Embassy, when the buildings had been actually hit; I said that never during my nine years in Japan had I been more anxious over any situation than these obviously deliberate attacks on our Embassy and ship, and that of all the difficult problems with which the Minister was faced, I felt certain that he was confronted with no more serious problem than this one. Mr. Matsuoka replied "I agree with you", yet the attacks continued, three or four of them within a few weeks. By such hair-breadth escapes are America and Japan still hoping and working to avoid a break.

You write of the desirability of our recognizing Japan's legitimate interests and aspirations. Indeed our Government has time and time again, and only recently, expressed its full appreciation of Japan's

legitimate interests and aspirations, realizing that Japan, restricted as she is in her islands, must have access to raw materials, markets for the products of her industries and a free flow of trade and commerce. Nevertheless, unless Japan is willing to abandon aggression by force there can be no hope for an improvement in our relations. We know by sad and bitter practical experience that Japan's so-called "New Order in East Asia" and "Co-Prosperity Sphere" visualize no neighborly relations on the basis of reciprocity and a free give-and-take but rather an order in which Japanese

interests, or what she conceives to be her interests, are to be predominant and to be exercised to the exclusion of the legitimate interests of other countries. We have watched the gradual but inexorable elimination of our own legitimate interests over these past several years, our long-standing and patiently-established business, commercial, industrial, banking and cultural interests, all legitimate and cooperative activities, progressively ousted first from Manchuria, and then, in turn, from North China, the ports, the Yangtze, and now they are in process of being excluded from Indochina, in spite of the most categorical assurances and promises that the Open Door and equal opportunity would be scrupulously observed everywhere. Every Foreign Minister -- especially Hirota, Arita, Nomura -- have given us such promises but not one of those promises has been carried out. Why? Those promises were unquestionably given in good faith. But the military would not permit their implementation. Japanese armed force has prevented their implementation. Is it surprising that when Admiral Toyoda assures me of Japan's peaceful intentions, I am obliged to recount to him those past bitter experiences? How, in the light of those experiences, can my Government believe any such promise or assurance given us by any Japanese Government?

Highly placed Japanese are constantly talking and writing about Anglo-American imperialism in East Asia,

about Anglo-American encirclement. Please look at the record. So far as the United States is concerned, we have always wished Japan well, have proved our friendship by concrete acts. In the old days we protected Japan from unequal treaties which other nations attempted to foist upon her. We counseled and actively helped Japan in her splendid efforts to become a great modern Power. At the time of the Great Earthquake we did everything in our power, spiritually and materially, to show our friendship for Japan and to support and aid her in her hour of trial. Up until the invasion of Manchuria in 1931 we were negotiating with China for the abrogation of the unequal treaties, ready and willing to abandon our extraterritorial rights, including our extraterritorial judicial, commercial and customs rights, and this would unquestionably have come to pass if Japan had not set out on her long course of aggression and the use of armed force as an instrument of national policy. The Exclusion Clause of our Immigration Act of 1924 cast a dark shadow on our relations, but do you know that prior to 1931 our Government had been steadily working to have that clause cancelled? In a few months that obnoxious clause, which naturally wounded your proud and sensitive people (even though it was a domestic measure, taken for the same economic protection that Japan has been continually invoking and acting upon during

recent years), would almost certainly have been withdrawn. But then came Japan's invasion of Manchuria, and we then knew that further efforts at that time to withdraw the exclusion clause were hopeless.

I do not believe that you, my dear friend, or many of your friends, have any detailed knowledge of the patience and forbearance exercised by the American Government and people in the face of the truly outrageous treatment of our own legitimate interests at the hands of Japanese authorities, both military and civil, during these past years. Our missions throughout China, including churches, hospitals, universities and schools, have been ruthlessly bombed and wrecked and American missionaries and their families have been killed or injured in spite of the fact that such buildings were clearly marked by American flags both flying and painted on the roofs and their precise location marked on maps submitted to the Japanese military authorities, showing that they were seldom if ever in the neighborhood of any military objectives. There can be no shadow of doubt that these cruel and brutal attacks were planned and executed with careful intention. Accidents can happen, but not two or three hundred accidents of the same kind. It is a saying among the Chinese that when a Chinese city or town is bombed by Japanese aviators, the most dangerous spot and the one to get far away from is the

American mission. It is perfectly clear that the Japanese bombers were following a concerted plan to drive American missionary, educational, medical and cultural activities out of China permanently. We might have broken relations with Japan on this issue alone, but we didn't; we remained patient and, permit me to say, long-suffering. Yet you write: "Even an incident one-tenth as bad as that of the bombing of Iran will never take place in this our part of the world."

The same concerted drive against our business firms, banks, industrial interests, commercial and shipping activities, has steadily and inexorably progressed, first in Manchuria, then in North China, the ports, the Yangtze valley, and now in Indochina where American-owned cargoes have been ruthlessly seized and shipped away. Is this the Open Door and equal opportunity, of the scrupulous safeguarding of which I so often received the most categorical assurances from successive Japanese governments?

Meanwhile the southward advance progressed step by step, one step at a time, first occupation, then consolidation, a pause to watch its result, and then another forward step. All this time many of your leading men, Admirals, Generals, retired Ambassadors, prominent writers, publicists and politicians, were contributing articles to

the daily press and magazines advocating the rapid pushing of the southward advance and the elimination of the Americans and Europeans and all of their interests and activities from the entire sphere of "Greater East Asia including the South Seas". And this advance was to be pursued first by high-pressure diplomacy and then, if necessary, by force. Can you possibly believe that if France had not been powerless she would have allowed the occupation of bases, both naval and aviation, in Indochina? Or can you possibly believe that Great Britain, completely occupied as she is with the war in Europe, where her own national life and the safety of the British Isles are at stake, would or could start a program of unprovoked aggression and invasion against Indochina or Thailand, or that the United States or the Netherlands would ever even consider such aggression? The fallacy of the alleged ABCD "encirclement" is too patent to fool even a school boy -- if he knows the facts. But in the light of Japan's recent actions and the clear intentions of so many of Japan's prominent men as expressed by them in their articles in the daily newspapers and magazines, is it surprising that the ABCD powers realize beyond a shadow of a doubt that it is they who are being "encircled" and that Malaya, Burma, Singapore, the Netherlands East Indies and the Philippines themselves are in direct line for future aggressive moves

by Japan in establishing and consolidating the so-called "New Order in Greater East Asia including the South Seas" and that defensive measures had therefore to be taken? From all that has passed and from all that is being said and written and done, the evidence is clear for all to see that what is euphemistically called the "Co-Prosperity Sphere" means eventual Japanese hegemony over all the areas therein contained. From all the evidence, is it not abundantly clear that we in the United States must now and in future be guided alone by facts and actions and that we can no longer rely on words or assurances of peaceful intentions? I have stated this fact categorically to Admiral Toyoda, after recounting to him our past bitter experiences when we did rely on such assurances.

To turn to the China Affair. Few people know, but I know, that about ten days or a fortnight after the outbreak of hostilities in July, 1937, Chiang Kai-shek sent a message through the British Embassy here to the Japanese Government, offering an immediate armistice and the withdrawal of all Chinese troops if the Japanese troops would likewise withdraw to a given line pending negotiations. Mr. Dodd was then the British Chargé d'Affaires, and when he received that message from the British Ambassador in Peking he came to ask my advice

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as to whether he ought to deliver it to the Japanese Government without instructions from London because his own Government might regard the step as in the nature of offering mediation, yet the message was too urgent for him to wait for instructions. I told him that he could not possibly take the responsibility of not delivering the message immediately, so he did so and later London approved. The message was delivered to Mr. Horinouchi who was then Vice Foreign Minister. But it died, alas, and nothing came of it. History will most certainly take full cognizance of that effort of Chiang Kai-shek for peace. The Japanese forces didn't want an armistice. They have now had war for over four long years with no end in sight. Chiang Kai-shek, a brave and far-sighted man, is still the legitimate head of the Chinese Government, is still fighting against ruthless aggression against his country, and Wang Ching-wei could not live a day if Japan's bayonets were withdrawn. How can he therefore be regarded as representative of China or, in fact, anything more than a puppet? I know well Japan's former troubles in China and with China, but those troubles could have been smoothed out eventually by peaceful negotiation. They have not and never will be smoothed out by war which, unless terminated on terms acceptable to the Chinese -- also a proud and sensitive people -- will

make real friendship between Japan and the Chinese as possible for generations to come.

Another and essential aspect of the situation is this. We believe, with abundant reason, that Germany, as controlled by the Nazis, seeks world domination by force and that once in control of Europe and the British Isles it would be only a question of time before the Western Hemisphere was attacked. Hitler has said as much in published statements. We believe that the Nazis seek to control and to alter our whole way of life. Therefore, as a reasonable and sensible measure of self-defense, we determined to help Great Britain to avoid defeat. When Japan allied herself with Germany we inevitably came to associate Japan with the same general program, so far as the Far East is concerned, and we thereupon determined to assist not only Great Britain but all other victims of aggression, including China. In pursuing that policy we feel that it would be utterly short-sighted to pour supplies into Great Britain across the Atlantic while complacently watching the potential cutting-off of Great Britain's other great life-line to the East which would be accomplished by the fall of Singapore to any Axis Power. Therefore, whatever threatens Singapore, directly concerns the United States. The occupation of bases in Indonesia definitely does threaten Singapore. The occupation of bases in Thailand would

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constitute a still more serious threat. Therefore, if Japanese forces should now undertake a further move on the line of the southward advance (and many Japanese openly advocate such a move), I question whether our relations could stand the strain involved.

Incidentally, you mention Iran. The British began to fight this war as amateurs perhaps, but at least like gentlemen. They trusted like gentlemen to Germany's pledged word. But gradually they saw what they were encountering, an enemy whose pledged word counted for nothing. In spite of non-aggression pacts and the most solemn assurances given on the very eve of aggression they saw one country after another fall to the absolutely ruthless invader and to the work of fifth columnists within those countries -- Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Belgium, Holland, France, Luxemburg, Denmark, Norway, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania, Greece, and now Soviet Russia -- as Churchill has so aptly said, "one by one". Do you remember what Hitler said after the seizure of Austria, and after Munich, and after the seizure of Czechoslovakia: "I am not completely satisfied. This is the last territorial readjustment I will seek." In every case Great Britain was too slow and too late. At last she has wisely learned by bitter experience, and it is that experience

which prompted her very wise occupation of Syria and Iran -- before Hitler could get there and could threaten the Suez Canal and the whole Mediterranean area. But note the difference: Hitler aims to control all of Europe and has so stated; Great Britain has pledged herself, and the world by experience can rely on her pledges, to withdraw from Iran and to restore her complete sovereignty the moment the necessity for these measures of self-defense has passed. I applaud her action. I cannot admire the action of Japan's allies.

Incidentally we now learn that the bombing of Iranian cities by either the British or Soviet forces has been officially denied. I am inclined to believe that the bombing report was merely Nazi propaganda.

International relations, if they are to be stable and secure, must be based upon the scrupulous observance of international commitments. Breaking of the pledged word between nations can lead only to international anarchy. Was it not the breaking of the Nine Power Treaty that constituted the first step in this long line of breaches of international commitments by certain nations? It is maintained in Japan that Japan did not break the Nine Power Treaty. Yet look at the text and the facts which speak for themselves. It is held in Japan that under changed conditions that treaty had become obsolete. Very well, but Government has stated in

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ategorical terms that it is ready at all times to consider the effect of changed conditions upon international commitments and to modify or modernize those commitments by peaceful negotiations. We do not regard and never have, as charged, regarded the status quo as permanently unalterable. Our negotiations with China for abandoning our extraterritorial rights proves the point, just as does our willingness to surrender our permanent leases in Japan and many other legitimate but outmoded rights. But once Japan resorted to force as an instrument of national policy in breaching an important international treaty, from which Japan had gained much when it was concluded because it was a carefully balanced undertaking, entered into by Japan freely and, at that time, gladly, a precedent was set and an example was created which were soon followed by other nations, beginning, as you will remember, by Italy's action in Ethiopia. This was the beginning of international chaos of which we see the sad result today.

Through the process of publicity and propaganda in Japan, largely stimulated from Axis sources, the Japanese people are today told that the Anglo-Saxon countries propose to "encircle" Japan by their imperialistic ambitions, to obtain complete hegemony in East Asia, to control commerce and trade and sources of raw materials, and to drive Japan to the wall. How untrue is this pic-

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ture you, my dear friend, know only too well, yet how can we hope to improve our relations so long as the Japanese people are made to believe these preposterous charges? My Government believes, and I believe, that Japan's legitimate interests and aspirations should be given the fullest recognition.

As you know, I am no defeatist. I believe that in spite of present difficulties we can still guide our ~~respective countries~~^{relations} into healthy channels, and for that high purpose I am constantly thinking and working. Below are four points which my Government regards as essential for our future good relations. We confidently believe that Japan would achieve the greatest happiness, security, prosperity and contentment by following a policy of peaceful and productive expansion based on the principle of free and equal treatment for all nations, a policy which would have the full support of the United States, while we believe that the continued use of armed force will lead eventually to social, economic and financial disaster. These are the points:

1. Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all nations.
2. Support of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
3. Support of the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity.

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4. Non-disturbance of the status quo in the Pacific except as the status quo may be altered by peaceful means.

On such a basis and, I fear, only on such a basis will the United States "ultimately come to sympathize with us in our efforts and, if possible, cooperate with us".

If Japan will mould her policy and actions on the basis of the foregoing four points and will abandon aggression, I see a happy outlook for the development of a new era in Japanese-American relations, contributing to Japan's future prosperity and welfare through a free flow of trade and commerce, access to the needed raw materials and a successful continuation of industrial development, resulting in a progressive raising of the standard of living of her people and a return to the old cultural values of life which have so brilliantly illuminated her background and history.

We should at all times be aware that the facts of geography are immutable. For better or for worse Divine Providence has placed our respective nations on either side of the Pacific; we are neighbors for all time to come; and nothing that anyone can do can alter that fact. Since the beginning of relations between our two countries -- almost ninety years ago -- we have maintained peace between ourselves, and with the exception of the past ten

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years, our relations have been marked by friendship, good will, and respect, the one for the other. The tradition of good neighborly relations must be restored, for if we fail in that task, there will be introduced into the Pacific the tradition of war which has cursed Europe since the beginning of history. We who are charged with the accomplishment of this task, who are working for the welfare not only of this generation but of those yet unborn, need your help and the help of all other men of good will.

With expressions of warm friendship, I am as always,
Dear

Cordially yours,

JOSEPH C. GRIFF

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

November 8,
1941.

Commander Watts of ONI informed Mr. Schmidt of FE that the Navy Department had seen Tokyo's 1769, November 7, 11 p.m., and Commander Watts said that the Secretary of the Navy would like to be informed of the contents of Tokyo's 1736, November 3, 3 p.m., to which reference is made in the last sentence of Tokyo's 1769, November 7, 11 p.m. Commander Watts was thereupon given a full paraphrase of Tokyo's 1736, November 3, 3 p.m.

MWB
FE:Schmidt:HES

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RAS Tokyo
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)
FROM Dated, November 7, 1941
Rec'd. 2:10 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division of Foreign Affairs
J-1
Department of State

1769, November 7, 11 p.m. (SECTION ONE).

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY AND UNDER SECRETARY.

211.9
One. A prominent Japanese who is in close touch with the Government came to see me today at the instance, he said, of the Foreign Minister. He said that as the Foreign Minister, Mr. Togo could not talk to me with the freedom he desired and therefore was sending me the following suggestion indirectly. The Japanese Government has reached a decision as to the concessions it will be possible to make toward meeting the viewpoint of the United States, but even if these concessions should prove disappointing to the American Government and should be regarded as inadequate, it is highly important that the concessions in Washington be continued and that they be not (admittedly) allowed to come to a breakdown.

Mr. Informant then continued as expressing
entirely

711.94/2425

PS/WHA

Confidential

JAN 9 - 1942

-2- 1957, November 7, 11 p.m. (SECTION ONE) From Tokyo.

ostensibly his own point of view which may or may not have reflected the views of the Minister. He said that the present situation was exerting a disastrous effect upon Japan and that if continued it would oblige the Government in due course to meet the position of the United States. If only for that reason the Washington conversations should not be allowed to lapse.

Three. I pointed out to informant and asked him so to inform the Foreign Minister, that the present truculent and aggressive Japanese press campaign against the United States, especially such articles as that contained in the JAPAN TIMES and ADVERTISER on November 5 (Department's 716, ^{not 212} November 5, 7 p.m.), last evening's NICHI NICHI article charging that the United States talked like a prostitute (Embassy's 1757, November 6, 6 p.m.) and other articles in similar vein, were rendering the efforts of the American Government and my own

GREW

CSB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM Toyko
 Dated November 7, 1941
 Rec'd 12:11 p.m.

This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated
 to anyone. (SC)

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

1769, November 7, 11 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

Efforts to bring about an adjustment of
 relations more and more difficult in the face of
 American public opinion which naturally believed
 that these inflammatory articles, particularly the
 articles in the JAPAN TIMES AND ADVERTISER, which
 is known to be the mouthpiece of the Foreign Office,
 correctly represented the attitude of the Japanese
 Government. Informant said that he would repeat
 my remarks to the Foreign Minister and would show
 him the articles under reference.

Four. Informant said that we must not pay too
 much attention to the Japanese press. When dogs
 are frightened, they bark, and the more they are
 frightened the louder they bark. At present the
 Japanese military are frightened at the future
 outlook. Changing the metaphor, informant said
 that the United States makes the mistake of re-
 garding the Japanese as mature people whereas
 they are

Confidential File

-2- #1769, November 7, 11 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

they are but children and should be treated as children. A friendly word or gesture inspires confidence. The Germans have understood this psychology of the Japanese and have played upon it with success.

Five. Once again informant begged that whatever might happen, the conversations be not allowed to come to a breakdown because, if a complete breakdown should occur, he feared the results envisaged in the final sentence of my 1736, November 3, 3 p.m.

(END OF MESSAGE)

GREW

ED.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

HRL
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SC)

Tokyo
FROM
Dated December 5, 1941

Rec'd 1:26

Secretary of State
Washington.

RECEIVED
DEC 11 1941
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Division of
EASTERN AFFAIRS
File
Department of State

1893, December 5, noon.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

11PW
My British colleague informs me that in the
opinion of the British Naval Attaché, who has
recently seen officials of the Japanese Navy
Ministry, the news of the arrival in Singapore of
British naval reinforcements including capital
ships has caused serious concern in Japanese naval
circles and the presence of British capital units
at Singapore, which was apparently not anticipated,
may have upset Japan's naval strategic plans.

GREW

HPL

DEC 13 1941

FILED

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

740.0011 PACIFIC WAR/677

PS/ATB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MEV

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

Tokyo

Dated December 8, 1941

From: d 5:23 a.m., 10th

Handwritten initials and marks

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1910, December 8, 1 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL


Embassy's 1906 December 8, 1 a.m.

One. The Foreign Minister at 7 o'clock this morning asked me to call on him at his official residence.

Two. He handed me a 13 page Memorandum, dated today, which he said had been transmitted to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington to present to you this morning (evening of December 7th Washington time). He said that he had already been in touch with the Emperor who desired that the aforesaid Memorandum be regarded as his reply to the President's message.

Three. The Foreign Minister thereupon made to me the following oral statement:

"His Majesty has expressed his gratefulness and appreciation for the cordial message of the President. He has graciously let known his wishes



740.0011 P. W. / 891

PS/WHA
Confidential File

FILED
DEC 17 1941

Handwritten notes:
711.24

-2- #1910, December 8, 1 p.m., from Tokyo

wishes to the Foreign Minister to convey the following to the President as a reply to the latter's message:

Some days ago, the President made inquiries regarding the circumstances of the augmentation of Japanese forces in French Indochina to which His Majesty has directed the Government to reply. Withdrawal of Japanese forces from French Indochina constitutes one of the subject matters of the Japanese-American negotiations. His Majesty has commanded the Government to state its views to the American Government also on this question. It is, therefore, desired that the President will kindly refer to this reply.

Establishment of peace in the Pacific, and consequently of the world, has been the cherished desire of His Majesty for the realization of which he has hitherto made his Government to continue its earnest endeavors. His Majesty trusts that the President is fully aware of this fact".

GREW

HPD